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Note
Must the Show Go On? Defining When One Party
May Call or Compel an Opposing Party's
Consultative Expert to Testify
Kathleen Michaela Brennan
Expert witnesses dominate the courtroom.' Litigators,
searching for the "perfect expert witness," consult and discard
numerous experts.2 Commentators disagree whether the oppos-
ing party should be able either to call or compel these discarded
experts to testify. Courts seeking to regulate expert discovery
have been unable to reconcile the conflicting policy issues behind
the rules of discovery.
1. For an informative survey of the prevalence of expert witnesses, see
Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. Rnv. 1113, 1119. Of the 529
civil trials in the Gross sample, 86% had expert witnesses. Id. Each trial in
which experts appeared had an average of 3.8 experts. Id. In addition, 60% of
the expert witnesses were "repeat" witnesses who had testified as an expert at
least twice in the last six years. Id. at 1120. Another source that courts and
commentators often cite is Michael H. Graham, Discovery of Experts Under
Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Part Two, an Empirical
Study and a Proposal, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 169. Graham conducted a survey of 222
federal judges and trial lawyers to determine their actual practices in discover-
ing expert witnesses. Id. at 171; see also David S. Day, The Ordinary Witness
Doctrine: Discovery of the Pre-Retention Knowledge of a Nonwitness Expert
Under Federal Rule 26(b)(4)(B), 38 Aiuc L. REv. 763, 763 (1985) ("Modern litiga-
tion has entered an age of experts.") (collecting sources); Matthew R. Wilder-
muth, Note, Blind Man's Bluff. An Analysis of the Discovery of Expert
Witnesses Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4) and a Proposed
Amendment, 64 IND. L. J. 925, 940-42 (1989) (noting increased use of experts).
2. Commentators criticize the current process of obtaining expert testi-
mony as more concerned with style than substantive testimony. See, e.g.,
Gross, supra note 1, at 1126-35 (describing the superficial qualities that liti-
gators seek in experts and the disgust that this shallow search engenders in all
of its participants-judges, lawyers and the experts themselves). One attorney
describes her ideal expert trial witness as someone "'around 50 years old, hav-
ing some gray in his hair, wear[s] a tweedy jacket and smoke[s] a pipe.'" Id. at
1133 (quoting Hyman Hillenbrand, The Effective Use of Expert Witnesses, BRIEF
48-49 (1987)). Some experts revel in this showcase by advertising themselves
in legal publications as experienced courtroom performers. Id. at 1131 (describ-
ing expert advertisements in legal periodicals), 1132 (describing expert referral
services).
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Although this problem arises in various factual scenarios,3
two cases exemplify the voluntary and compelled sides of the
consultative expert dilemma. 4 In Healy v. Counts,5 the plaintiff
in a medical malpractice action retained two doctors as consulta-
tive expert witnesses, but both experts determined there was no
malpractice. 6 One expert happened to know the attorney repre-
senting the defendant and, when the attorney asked the expert
to review the medical records, the expert realized the records
belonged to the same case and offered to testify for the defend-
ant.7 In Fenlon v. Thayer,8 the plaintiffs in a medical malprac-
tice action obtained a copy of a report from the defendant's
medical expert during pre-trial discovery.9 The plaintiffs de-
cided to subpoena the expert to testify at trial despite the ex-
pert's unwillingness to testify for them.10
Most courts confronting the consultative expert dilemma
must decide whether they will admit the testimony of an expert
willing to testify for the adverse party." In a few cases, one
party asks the court to compel the expert's testimony.12 Com-
mentators that have addressed this issue tend to ignore the dis-
tinction.13 This Note will focus on the more prevalent issue of
3. See, e.g., Levitsky v. Prince George's County, 439 A.2d 600, 604-06 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1982) (allowing plaintiff to call an appraiser originally hired by
the defendant to testify in a condemnation award; the appraiser calculated a
high value for the plaintiffs property and the defendant thus decided not to call
the appraiser as a testifying expert).
4. The "consultative expert dilemma" hereinafter refers to whether, when
one party retains an expert and then elects not to use him, the opposing party
may then call or compel him to testify.
5. 100 F.R.D. 493, 493 (D. Colo. 1984).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. 506 A.2d 319, 319 (N.H. 1986).
9. Id. at 320.
10. Id. at 320-321.
11. E.g., Granger v. Wisner, 656 P.2d 1238, 1240 (Ariz. 1982) ("allowed");
Pinkett v. Brittingham, 567 A.2d 858, 859-61 (Del. 1989) ("allowed" and "per-
mitted"); Knoff v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 380 N.W.2d 313, 319 (N.D. 1986)
("permit"); Lazorick v. Brown, 480 A.2d 223, 224 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1984) ("allowed"); Cogdell v. Brown, 531 A.2d 1379, 1381-82 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1987) ("permit").
12. E.g., Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Otte, 474 F.2d 529, 536 (2d Cir. 1972); Fen-
lon v. Thayer, 506 A.2d 319, 320-21 (N.H. 1986); Gilly v. City of New York, 516
N.Y.S.2d 166, 167 (N.Y. 1987); Young v. Strong, 499 N.Y.S.2d 988, 990 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1986).
13. This confusion extends to commentators' and courts' characterization of
the issue. For example, an American Law Reports article's title uses "compel-
ling," yet most of the cases collected discuss "allowing" an expert to testify. Lori
J. Henkel, Annotation, Compelling Testimony of Opponent's Expert in State
Court, 66 A.L.R. 4TH 213 (1987).
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allowing the voluntary expert to testify, but will also address
arguments about compelling the testimony as necessary.
Despite the relative frequency 14 of the consultative expert
dilemma, no commentator has suggested a solution to the spe-
cific problem of either calling or compelling an expert formerly
retained by the adverse party to testify.'5 Moreover, most
courts deciding this issue focus on Rule 26 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and ignore the Federal Rules of Evidence.
This Note explains the conflicts raised by calling or compel-
ling an adverse party's consultative expert witness to testify.
Part I explains the rules of procedure and evidence, and outlines
the conflicting case law. Part II criticizes courts applying rules
of discovery to this evidentiary issue and explains that no tradi-
tional privileges protect the expert's testimony. Part III pro-
poses an amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence to admit
the testimony of an adverse party's consultative expert if the
proffering party demonstrates a reasonable need for the testi-
mony, subject to the trial court's discretion to exclude unduly
prejudicial testimony. This Note concludes that trial courts
should admit the testimony of a consultative witness, if the prof-
fering party demonstrates a "reasonable need" for the expert's
testimony, to further open discovery policies, promote fairness,
and contribute to the pursuit of truth.
I. A CONFUSING SCENARIO: OVERLAPPING RULES
AND CONFLICTING CASE LAW
Currently, courts and commentators use Rule 26 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure to resolve the nontestifying expert
dilemma in civil trials.16 Expert testimony issues rarely arise in
criminal trials,17 and this Note will only briefly consider the rel-
14. Dennis R. Suplee & Margaret S. Woodruff, The Pretrial Use of Experts,
PR~c. LAw., Sept. 1987, at 9, 15 (describing situation as "not uncommon"). In
fact, the compelled consultative expert dilemma probably arises more often
than it is reported. Michael H. Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule
26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Part One, An Analytical Study,
1976 U. ILL. L.F. 895, 935.
15. Gross describes the dilemma as one of many issues currently facing
expert witnesses and briefly discusses the conflicting perspectives and case law
surrounding it. Gross, supra note 1, at 1149-51.
16. See infra notes 54-55, 58 and accompanying text (collecting cases).
17. Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence
After Sixteen Years-The Effect of 'Plain Meaning' Jurisprudence, the Need for
an Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective
Revision of the Rules, 60 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 857, 861 (1992) ("most problems
with expert testimony arise in civil cases."); see also discussion infra notes 121-
1193
1194 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:1191
evant criminal matters. This Note proposes the creation of Rule
707 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to provide a superior reso-
lution of this problem.
A. RULE 26 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIvIL PROCEDURE AND
ITS CONFLICTING POLICIES
Most courts rely on either Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure or its underlying policies to exclude expert testi-
mony.' 8 Rule 26 prescribes the procedure for discovering expert
witnesses.' 9 Under Rule 26, discovery of expert witnesses in-
volves a preliminary exchange of information 20 and possible
subsequent discovery by depositions, 2 ' interrogatories 22 and
other means of obtaining the expert's opinion or knowledge of
the facts at issue. The rule assigns expert witnesses to two
broad categories: "testifying experts" and "consultative ex-
perts,"23 which are those experts who will not testify at trial.
124 and accompanying text (describing effect proposed Federal Rule of Evi-
dence will have on experts in criminal trials).
18. E.g., Campbell Indus. v. M/V Gemini, 619 F.2d 24, 26 (9th Cir. 1980)
(ex parte contacts between defendant and plaintiffs consultative expert while
expert was employed by defendant constituted a "flagrant violation" of Rule
26(b)(4)(B)).
19. Rule 26(b)(1) allows for liberal discovery of "any matter.., relevant to
the subject matter involved" and Rule 26(b)(4) exclusively concerns expert wit-
nesses and provides further guidelines for discovery of expert witnesses. FED.
R. Cmv. P. 26. Rule 26(b) reads, in relevant part:
(4) Trial Preparation: Experts.
(A) A party may depose any person who has been identified as an
expert whose opinions may be presented at trial....
(B) A party may, through interrogatories or by deposition, dis-
cover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained
or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or
preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness
at trial only as provided in Rule 35(b) [mental and physical examina-
tion reports] or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under
which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts
or opinions on the same subject by other means.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
20. The 1993 amendments to Rule 26 require each party to disclose auto-
matically "to the other parties the identity of any person who may be used at
trial to present evidence." FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(2). Each party also must dis-
close a report detailing the expert's opinion, the basis for the opinion, the ex-
pert's qualifications, the compensation the expert will receive, and a list of
other cases in which the expert has testified in the preceding four years. Id.
21. FED. R. Cirv. P. 26(a)(5).
22. Id.
23. Rule 26(b)(4)(A) allows a party to depose experts who will testify at
trial. FED. R. Civ. P. 26. Rule 26(b)(4)(B) concerns experts "retained" by a party
"in anticipation of litigation" who are "not expected to be called as a witness at
trial." FED. R. CIrv. P. 26. Two additional categories include informally-con-
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Rule 26 grants the adverse party great latitude in con-
ducting its discovery of testifying experts.24 The policy behind
this liberal discovery rule is to allow the adverse party to pre-
pare for an effective cross-examination. 25 Accordingly, each
party must identify its testifying experts, the topic about which
the expert will testify, the "substance" of the expert's opinion,
and a synopsis of the "grounds" of the opinion.26
In contrast, Rule 26 restricts discovery of consultative ex-
perts. To obtain discovery of these experts, the party seeking
discovery must demonstrate "exceptional circumstances" ren-
dering alternative discovery methods of the subject matter
"impracticable."27 Courts do not apply the "exceptional circum-
stances" rule in a uniform manner.28 This inconsistency stems,
in part, from the clashing objectives of Rule 26.
sulted experts a party does not retain and experts a party does not retain in
anticipation of litigation. Ager v. Jane C. Stormont Hosp., 622 F.2d 496, 500-
501 (10th Cir. 1980). In Ager, the plaintiff in a medical malpractice action re-
fused to reveal the names of its nontestifying expert witnesses. Id. at 498. The
court remanded the case to determine whether the experts were retained, non-
testifying experts, or informally-consulted experts. Id. at 504.
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note (1970) (noting that the
need for more open discovery of testifying experts is evident in "the many cases
in which discovery of expert trial witnesses is needed for effective cross-exami-
nation and rebuttal, and yet courts apply the traditional doctrine and refuse
disclosure").
25. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(4)(B) advisory committee's note (1970) ("Effective
cross-examination of an expert witness requires advance preparation.").
26. FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(a)(2).
27. FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(b)(4)(B) (the party seeking discovery of the consulta-
tive expert must demonstrate "exceptional circumstances under which it is im-
practicable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the
same subject by other means").
28. Compare Marine Petroleum Co. v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 641 F.2d
984, 994 n.60 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (denying plaintiffs attempt to depose the defend-
ant's consultative expert because the plaintiff had access to other bases of infor-
mation and thus failed to demonstrate "exceptional circumstances" under Rule
26) and Mantolete v. Bolger, 96 F.R.D. 179, 182-83 (D. Ariz. 1982) (same) with
Coates v. AC & S, Inc., 133 F.R.D. 109, 110 (E.D. La. 1990) (allowing plaintiff to
depose defendant's expert about his conclusions concerning tissue samples
taken from decedent). In Coates, the court reasoned that exceptional circum-
stances existed because doctors had "difficulty in diagnosing mesothelioma" and
although both parties could interview many experts, each might find only one
supportive expert and the jury might incorrectly infer that experts evenly di-
vided on the issue. Coates, 133 F.R.D. at 110.
In addition, commentators and courts do not always agree upon an inter-
pretation of the "exceptional circumstances" test. Most commentators agree
that the opponent may not discover the names of consultative witnesses with-
out showing exceptional circumstances. 8 CHARLEs A. WIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2032 (1970 & Supp. 1993); Note,
Discovery of Retained Nontestifying Experts'Identities Under the Federal Rules
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Rule 26's treatment of expert testimony does not make
sense because the policy goals behind the rule conflict. 29 Gener-
ally, the drafters of Rule 26 strove to establish more open chan-
nels of discovery and, thereby, a freer exchange of information. 30
The drafters stressed the necessity of open discovery because, in
their view, effective cross-examination and readiness for trial re-
quire "advance preparation."31 Hence, most commentators, not-
ing these liberal discovery policies, agree that attorneys may not
shield an expert from discovery or testimony simply because
that person is an expert witness.32 In addition, some commenta-
tors see no difficulty in allowing a party to contact an expert
of Civil Procedure, 80 MICH. L. REv. 513, 521-22 (1982) (arguing that parties
should not reveal the names of consultative experts). But see Bald v. B.F. Dia-
mond Constr. Co., 71 F.R.D. 179, 182 (D. Md. 1976) (concluding that one party
need not show exceptional circumstances to obtain the names, addresses and
"other identifying information" of the adverse party's consultative expert
witness).
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) advisory committee's note (1970) (referring to the
need for "advance preparation" for cross-examination and the "fear that one
side will benefit unduly from the other's better preparation"); Day, supra note 1,
at 791 n.161 (noting that Rule 26(b)(4)(B) forms a "middle ground" between the
conflicting policies of "open discovery" and no discovery).
30. Rule 26(b)(1) states that "Ip]arties may obtain discovery regarding any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The drafters viewed discovery as a
means of "narrowing [the] issues and eliminat[ing] ... surprise." FED. R. Cirv.
P. 26(b) advisory committee's note (1970). The plain language of the rule thus
encourages open discovery. For an additional discussion of the liberal intent of
Rule 26, see Bockweg v. Anderson, 117 F.R.D. 563, 564-65 (M.D.N.C. 1987).
31. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note (1970). Furthermore,
"effective rebuttal requires advance knowledge of the line of testimony of the
other side." Id.
32. See, e.g., Day, supra note 1, at 792 (asserting that consultative process,
not expert, is partially immunized from discovery); 10 FED. PRoc., L. Ed. § 26,
at 121 & n.60 (1988) (criticizing cases that excluded expert testimony solely
because witness was expert) (citing cases); Jack H. Friedenthal, Discovery and
Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 STAN. L. REV. 455, 460 (1962)
("Without special justification, communications with an expert ought not to be
protected any more than communications of any other agent."); Kelly McDon-
ald, Note, Gimme Shelter? Not If You Are a Non-Witness Expert Under Rule
26(b)(4)(B), 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 1027, 1030 (1988) (describing prevalent practice
of expert "sheltering" in which one party retains expert as consultative witness
solely to prevent adverse party from discovering expert's opinion); see also Car-
rasquillo v. Rothschild, 443 N.Y.S.2d 113, 115 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (discussing
one party's ability to retain "outstanding" experts to "deny" the adverse party
"access" to these excellent experts). To resolve this harmful practice, Congress
should amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Solving the shielding of
consultative expert witnesses, however, falls outside the scope of this Note.
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favorable to its position, even if its opponent hired the expert
first.3 3
Although open discovery benefits litigating parties, Rule 26
also seeks to prevent exploiting open discovery. The "unfairness
rule" thus embodies a second major policy underlying Rule 26. A
noted commentator defined the unfairness rule as follows: "it is
unfair for one party, without expense, to obtain information
from an expert who has been hired by the opposing party for an
agreed compensation."3 4 The unfairness rule encompasses two
policy arguments. The expert's testimony or knowledge may be
the expert's property; therefore, taking the testimony or compel-
ling it without pay is unfair.35 In addition, the unfairness rule
asserts that unrestricted discovery procedures would "promote
laziness" and result in one side doing the work for both sides.36
This rule discourages "free-riding," or building one's case upon
efforts of the opposing party.3 7
Additionally, Rule 26 attempts to preserve the relationship
between attorneys and experts by protecting consultative ex-
perts from abusive discovery practices 38 and compelled testi-
mony. Experts rely on their reputation for loyalty to the party
that hired them.3 9 Compelling experts' testimony could destroy
any reputation they have for loyalty by forcing them to testify
33. Gross, supra note 1, at 1150-51. In addition, a district judge for the
Eastern District of New York finds "nothing unethical" in one party's interview-
ing the opponents expert once it knows the opponent will not use the expert at
trial. Joseph M. McLaughlin, Discovery and Admissibility of Expert Testimony,
63 NOTRE DAE L. REV. 760, 767-69 (1988) (collecting New York cases).
34. Friedenthal, supra note 32, at 479.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. The advisory committee's note mentions its concern that "one side will
benefit unduly from the other's better preparation." FED. R. Cri. P. 26 advisory
committee's note (1970). One commentator has explained that Rule 26 requires
each side to prepare its case before opening the case to discovery and cross-
examination. Day, supra note 1, at 797 n.193; see also Ager v. Jane C. Stormont
Hasp., 622 F.2d 496, 502 (10th Cir. 1980) (defining the unfairness rule as a rule
"designed to prevent a party from building his own case by means of his oppo-
nent's financial resources, superior diligence and more aggressive
preparation").
38. One commentator has suggested that Rule 26 strives to avoid discovery
abuse, by preventing the distortion of evidence, protecting nontestifying expert
availability and providing clear rules for courts to follow. Day, supra note 1, at
792; see also McDonald, supra note 32, at 1030 (describing expert shielding and
concluding that it violates drafters' intent in Rule 26 for more liberal discovery).
39. See James B. Platt, Comment, Discovery of the Nonwitness Expert
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(B), 67 IowA L. REV. 349, 363-64
n.10 (1982) (arguing that expert's career success depends, in large part, upon
her reputation for loyalty to hiring party).
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for the other side. Compelling expert testimony might discour-
age experts from acting as consultative witnesses, diminishing
the pool of eligible experts.40 In particular, experts who testify
for unpopular parties, such as doctors who testify for plaintiffs
in medical malpractice suits, are already few in number.41
Parties also use the attorney-client privilege42 and the work
product rule43 to prevent courts from compelling their consulta-
tive expert to testify for their opponent.44 The attorney-client
privilege protects communications made by the client to the at-
40. E.g., Healy v. Counts, 100 F.R.D. 493, 497 (D. Colo. 1984) (expressing
concern about negative impact that adverse consultative expert testimony
would have on available medical experts in medical malpractice actions); Ager,
622 F.2d at 503 (refusing discovery because it "would inevitably lessen the
number of candid opinions available as well as the number of consultants will-
ing to even discuss a potential medical malpractice claim with counsel").
41. Ager, 622 F.2d at 503 (noting "widespread aversion" of medical experts
to medical malpractice litigation and limited availability of nontestifying medi-
cal experts, and concluding that "absent special circumstances, discovery evalu-
ative consultants' identity [should] be denied"); see also Healy, 100 F.R.D. at
497 (arguing that allowing consultative witness to testify for adverse party
would diminish "pool of potential expert medical [malpractice] witnesses"). One
commentator includes school desegregation experts, who testify on behalf of
school districts charged with segregation, within this caste of unpopular ex-
perts. Gross, supra note 1, at 1131 n.55.
Some courts, in contrast, use the particular role of doctors as experts in
medical malpractice cases to bolster the contacts allowed between the expert
and the adverse party. In Lazorick v. Brown, 480 A.2d 223 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1984), for example, the court rejected the plaintiffs argument that
the doctors treating the patient owed the plaintiff a duty of loyalty which for-
bade contact with the defendants. Id. at 229. The Lazorick court reasoned that
the experts "may sympathize with another doctor who they believe has been
unjustly accused of malpractice. They may feel an obligation to see justice done
as they view it." Id.
42. At least one court has established a precise definition of the common
law attorney-client privilege:
[Wihere legal advice of any kind is sought from a professional legal
advisor in his capacity as such, the communications relevant to that
purpose, made in confidence by the client, are at his instance perma-
nently protected from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor ex-
cept the protection be waived.
8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 28, § 2017, at 133 (quoting Wonneman v. Strat-
ford Sec. Co., 23 F.R.D. 281, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1959)).
43. Rule 26 defines the attorney work product rule: "[tihe court shall pro-
tect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litiga-
tion." FED. R. Cr. P. 26(b)(3).
44. Several commentators have listed these two rules and add the "rule of
unfairness" as a third rationale. Friedenthal, supra note 32, at 455; David G.
Crockett, Note, Civil Procedure-Discovery of Expert Information, 47 N.C. L.
REv. 401, 403-04 (1969).
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torney in her capacity as attorney.45 This privilege encourages
frank and open communication between the client and attorney
so that the attorney can best assist the client.46 The work prod-
uct rule47 protects documents prepared in anticipation of litiga-
tion by the attorney or by a "representative" acting on behalf of
the party.48 In the context of the discovery of experts, courts
must decide whether an expert qualifies as a party's "represen-
tative."49 The attorney-client privilege and the work product
rule, however, do not compel courts to exclude disputed expert
testimony; in fact, courts have argued to the contrary.50 Absent
such a privilege, the trial court should admit the testimony.51
B. A MAZE OF CONFLICTING CASE LAw UNDER RULE 26
Most commentators agree that federal and state courts have
mishandled the issue of admitting the testimony of an expert
originally retained by the opponent. 52 Courts employ the policy
45. See supra note 42 (defining attorney-client privilege). When deciding
whether the attorney-client privilege prohibits discovery or compelled testi-
mony, courts often employ criteria that evaluate the "type of agent" who com-
municated with the attorney and "the nature of the communication."
Friedenthal, supra note 32, at 457 (citing cases).
46. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 28, § 2032 (citing cases).
47. The work product rule is not a privilege, but a judicially-developed the-
ory designed to protect an attorney's thought processes in building a case. See
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). In Hickman, the Supreme Court held
that "written statements, private memoranda and personal recollections pre-
pared or formed by an adverse party's counsel in the course of his legal du-
ties.... fall[ ] outside the arena of discovery." Id. at 510. The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure codify the Hickman decision in Rule 26. FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(3).
48. Jan W. Henkel & 0. Lee Reed, Work Product Privilege and Discovery of
Expert Testimony: Resolving the Conflict Between Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure 26(b)(3) and 26(b)(4), 16 FiLa. ST. U. L. REV. 313, 317 (1988) (contending
that work product rule includes almost "any" representative acting on behalf of
party's attorney).
49. See Friedenthal, supra note 32, at 471-74 (discussing case law distin-
guishing attorneys from their "agent" for work product purposes).
50. E.g., Sun Charm Ranch, Inc. v. City of Orlando, 407 So. 2d 938, 939
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (noting that "[t]he traditional barriers to this prac-
tice-work product privilege, attorney-client privilege, and 'unfairness'-have
been substantially eroded in this context").
51. 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEiNsTE&s EVIDENCE,
T 501[06], at 501-66 (1993) (citing cases) [hereinafter WEINsTEIN].
52. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 14, at 934 (stating that the "law is un-
clear"); Crockett, supra note 44, at 406 ("Confrontation with the morass of case
law on discovery of expert information should dispel a court's temptation to re-
solve a case solely on the basis of precedent. Surely decisions can best be
reached through consideration of each case's individual circumstances in the
light of underlying discovery policy."); James L. Hayes & Paul T. Ryder, Jr.,
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considerations underlying Rule 26 in a contradictory fashion to
both exclude 53 and admit54 the consultative expert's testimony.
Some courts rely upon the rule's plain language to exclude the
testimony.55 In contrast, other courts allow counsel to question
the expert witness about his original consultation with the oppo-
nent because the questioning affects the weight and credibility
of the expert's testimony.56 Finally, still other courts seek to
strike a middle ground, admitting testimony from the oppo-
nent's rejected consultative expert, but excluding testimony
about the expert's original position with the opponent.57
When courts exclude testimony from the opponent's consult-
ative expert, they typically base their decision on the policy rea-
Note, Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Discovery of Expert
Information, 42 U. MLtI L. REv. 1101, 1163 (1988) (noting that, in issue of
compelling opponent's consultative expert to testify, question remains
unanswered).
53. E.g., Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir. 1984) (excluding
consultative expert's testimony because proffering party "circumvented" discov-
ery rules in bad faith); Healy v. Counts, 100 F.R.D. 493, 496 (D. Colo. 1984)
(excluding testimony of doctor originally retained by plaintiffs in medical mal-
practice action); Young v. Strong, 499 N.Y.S.2d 988, 990 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)
(relying upon unfairness rule to exclude consultative expert's testimony and
stating that "[wihere there is no difficulty in obtaining other expert testimony,
one party may not call as a witness another party's expert").
54. E.g., Lazorick v. Brown, 480 A.2d 223, 229 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1984) (admitting all competent and relevant evidence that is not privileged);
Carrasquillo v. Rothschild, 443 N.Y.S.2d 113, 115 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (allowing
a consultative expert to testify because the court reasoned that the goal of liti-
gation is to find the truth); Board of Educ. of S. Sanpete Sch. Dist. v. Barton,
617 P.2d 347, 350 (Utah 1980) (allowing consultative expert's testimony be-
cause it would contribute to weight and substance of defendant's testimony).
55. E.g., Campbell Indus. v. M/V Gemini, 619 F.2d 24,26-27 (9th Cir. 1980)
(holding that ex parte meetings between defendant and expert retained by
plaintiff constituted a "flagrant violation" of Rule 26). The Campbell court did
not specify which provision of Rule 26 the defendant's actions violated. See id.
at 27.
56. E.g., Fenlon v. Thayer, 506 A.2d 319, 322-23 (N.H. 1986) (holding that
plaintiff in medical malpractice action may subpoena medical expert originally
retained by defendant and question expert about prior employment with de-
fendant); Cogdell v. Brown, 531 A.2d 1379, 1382 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1987) (same); Barton, 617 P.2d at 350 ("The jury was entitled to know the es-
sential background facts of the witness so as to be able to give proper weight to
his testimony.").
57. E.g., Granger v. Wisner, 656 P.2d 1238, 1242 (Ariz. 1982) (prohibiting
defense questioning of medical expert on direct examination about prior consul-
tation with plaintiff); Sun Charm Ranch, Inc. v. City of Orlando, 407 So. 2d 938,
940 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (allowing plaintiff to call appraiser originally re-
tained by City of Orlando to testify, but prohibiting plaintiff from questioning
appraiser about previous employment with city).
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sons underlying Rule 26(b), not its actual language. 58 If they
first determine that using the adverse party's consultative ex-
pert unfairly advantages the proffering party, they will exclude
the testimony because it allows the proffering party to rely upon
its opponent's work,5 9 violating the unfairness rule.60
Other courts exclude the testimony because admitting it
would put the opposing party in the "no-win" situation of cross-
examining its own consultative witness. 61 The cross-examining
party might hesitate to attack the expert's credentials or credi-
bility for fear that, in rebuttal, the opposing party would point
out that the expert's qualifications were acceptable to the cross-
examining party when the party first hired the expert.62 More-
over, the cross-examining party might be forced to impeach the
expert's testimony with information that the expert obtained
during previous employment with that party.63 Traditional
cross-examination tactics thus fail against the expert originally
retained by the cross-examiner.
58. Healy v. Counts, 100 F.R.D. 493, 495 (D. Colo. 1984) (noting that the
fact situation fell "beyond the explicit language of Rule 26(b)(4)(B)" and com-
menting that there was "virtually nothing in print to guide [the trial court's]
decision" to exclude or admit the expert's testimony). The Healy judge contin-
ued by stating that "[mly decision is guided by several policy decisions." Id. at
496; see also Piller v. Kovarsky, 476 A.2d 1279, 1281 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1984) (preventing physician who treated plaintiff in medical malpractice action
from testifying for defense by relying, inter alia, upon public policy reasoning).
59. E.g., Young v. Strong, 499 N.Y.S.2d 988,990 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)
(compelling defendant's surveyor to testify for plaintiffs would be unfair, espe-
cially when plaintiff already has another expert); Brink v. Multnomah County,
356 P.2d 536, 541 (Or. 1960) (contending that by allowing disputed expert testi-
mony, court would unfairly penalize hard-working trial lawyers and would re-
ward laziness); see also Henkel, supra note 13, at 236-38 (collecting cases).
60. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text (defining the unfairness
rule).
61. E.g., Healy, 100 F.R.D. at 496-97 (expressing concern that court could
not "adequately protect" party that originally hired consultative witness).
62. See, e.g., Granger v. Wisner, 656 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Ariz. 1982) (reason-
ing that "[airguably, that prior consultation [between adverse party and expert]
might be an admission that plaintiff believed the witness to be qualified");
Piller, 476 A.2d at 1282 (asserting that "defendants [proffering party] have an
unfair advantage when they present [the plaintiffs' consultative expert] be-
cause the plaintiffs have already necessarily vouched for his credibility and the
value of his opinions").
63. See, e.g., Granger, 656 P.2d at 1243 (refusing to allow plaintiffs former
consultative expert to testify for defendant primarily because plaintiff would be
unable to cross-examine expert effectively and stating that "[cdross-examination
is a difficult art which is not made easier when counsel must perform it on a
tightrope").
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Courts that admit or compel the expert's testimony either
ignore Rule 26 or claim that Rule 26 does not apply.64 Most
courts that overlook Rule 26 admit or compel 65 the expert's testi-
mony after determining that no privilege protects it.66 These
courts argue that it is unfair to "shield"67 an expert from discov-
ery and deny the adverse party access to the potentially helpful
expert.
68
Even if courts admit the disputed expert testimony, they do
not agree whether the the proffering party may question the wit-
ness about prior employment with the opposing party.69 Courts
64. Steele v. Seglie, No. 84-2200, 1986 WL 30765, at *3 (D. Kan. Mar. 27,
1986) (stating that Rule 26 applies to the discovery of expert testimony, not to
the potential suppression of expert testimony); Granger, 656 P.2d at 1242 (rea-
soning that Rule 26 "does not address itself to the admissibility at trial of the
testimony of such an expert which is elicited by the opponent" and that "the
rules of discovery provide no express basis for the suppression of such testi-
mony"); Fenlon v. Thayer, 506 A.2d 319, 321 (N.H. 1986) (concluding that Rule
26 does not control testimony at trial).
65. See Fenlon, 506 A.2d at 322 (stating that "the rule favoring testimonial
compulsion should be applied to all experts, including doctors, appraisers, and
others").
66. See, e.g., Sun Charm Ranch, Inc. v. City of Orlando, 407 So. 2d 938, 939
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (allowing plaintiffs to call appraiser originally re-
tained by City of Orlando to testify at trial because no privileges protected ap-
praiser's testimony); Knoff v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 380 N.W.2d 313,
319-320 (N.D. 1986) (allowing defendant-corporation in nuisance action to call
appraiser originally hired by plaintiff to testify at trial because expert fell
outside scope of traditional privileges); Board of Educ. of S. Sanpete Sch. Dist.
v. Barton, 617 P.2d 347, 349-50 (Utah 1980) (admitting expert testimony of ap-
praiser in eminent domain action because it concerned "the heart of the issue at
trial," fell outside of any evidentiary privileges, and jury was entitled to hear it).
67. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (discribing expert shielding).
68. E.g., Cogdell v. Brown, 531 A.2d 1379, 1381 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1987) ("No party to litigation has anything resembling a proprietary right to
any witness's evidence."); Lazorick v. Brown, 480 A.2d 223, 228 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1984) ("Even an expert whose knowledge has been purchased cannot
be silenced by the party who is paying him on that ground alone.") (quoting Doe
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 128 (D.D.C. 1983)). Some attorneys regularly
"shield" experts by retaining the experts as consultative witnesses to avoid dis-
covery by the adverse party. Gross, supra note 1, at 1131 n.54; see also McDon-
ald, supra note 32, at 1030 (noting importance of good faith conduct in pre-trial
discovery).
69. To obtain an overview of this conflicting case law, compare cases ex-
cluding the questioning, such as Steele v. Seglie, No. 84-2200, 1986 WL 30765,
at *4 (D. Kan. Mar. 27, 1986); Granger v. Wisner, 656 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Ariz.
1982); Sun Charm Ranch, Inc. v. City of Orlando, 407 So. 2d 938, 940 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1981); Knoffv. American Crystal Sugar Co., 380 N.W.2d 313, 319 (N.D.
1986), with those cases that admit the questioning of the experts about their
original employment with the adverse party, Fenlon v. Thayer, 506 A.2d 319,
323 (N.H. 1986); Cogdell v. Brown, 531 A.2d 1379, 1382 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1987); Levitsky v. Prince George's County, 439 A.2d 600, 606 (Md. Ct.
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that allow the party to question the consultative expert assert
that the trier of fact ought to know about the expert's prior deal-
ings with the opposing party because it relates to the weight and
credibility of the expert's opinion. 70 Testimony about the ex-
pert's original employer allows an attorney to expose the ex-
pert's bias.7 ' The trier of fact should know whether one side
"shopped" for an expert to support its theory of the case.72 These
courts thus admit or compel the expert's testimony because it is
relevant, probative, and falls outside protective privileges.
On the other hand, some courts refuse to allow the proffer-
ing party to question the expert about prior employment with
the adverse party because this questioning would overempha-
size the witness in the jury's mind73 or because such questioning
would be too prejudicial. 74 Other courts reason that by granting
the party's request to subpoena the expert or allow the expert to
testify, the party already has the upper hand.75
Spec. App. 1982); Board of Educ. of S. Sanpete Sch. Dist. v. Barton, 617 P.2d
347, 351 (Utah 1980).
70. E.g., Fenlon, 506 A.2d at 323 (finding that "the fact that a party's ad-
versary first contacted the expert is material to the weight and credibility of
that expert's testimony"). But see Sun Charm Ranch, 407 So. 2d at 940 (con-
cluding that the "relevancy of this evidence is the inference that the party who
fails to call an expert is covering up harmful evidence or concealing bad facts"
but the party may have other legitimate reasons for not calling expert whom
the party originally consulted).
71. JOHN KAPLAN, et al., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 505 (7th ed.
1992) (concluding that "[piroof of bias and the like is always relevant to credibil-
ity and can be inquired into thoroughly"); see also Barton, 617 P.2d at 350 (rea-
soning that jury should know essential facts about witness's background in
order to give proper weight to testimony).
72. E.g., Fenlon, 506 A.2d at 323 ("Whether an expert is a hired gun' or one
whose opinions have greater foundations of objectivity is an issue to be litigated
by counsel and considered by the jury."); Cogdell, 531 A.2d at 1382 (same).
73. These courts fear that juries would give the expert's testimony too
much weight because both parties retained the same expert. Wildermuth,
supra note 1, at 943 (citing cases).
74. Sun Charm Ranch, 407 So.2d at 940 (questioning fairness of rule that
would require party to explain and apologize to jury for not calling expert wit-
ness to testify). Cf. State Highway Comm'n v. Earl, 143 N.W.2d 88, 92 (S.D.
1966) (concluding that when adverse party calls the opponent's former consult-
ative expert, "[tjhe party calling such expert makes [the expert] his witness,
therefore, the fact of prior employment or payment by the opposite party is not
relevant or material").
75. E.g., Steele v. Seglie, No. 84-2200, 1986 WL 30765, at *5 (D. Kan. Mar.
27, 1986) (stating that although prohibiting questions to expert witnesses about
prior retention by plaintiffs may restrict defendants' ability to rehabilitate ex-
pert witness, that is small price to defendants for right to present expert testi-
mony at trial).
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C. AN ALTERNATIVE TO RULE 26: RELEVANT RULES OF THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
Some courts use the Federal Rules of Evidence to resolve
the consultative expert dilemma, arguing that Rule 26 does not
apply.7 6 These courts turn to Rules 702, 703 and 403 to provide
another framework to evaluate the admission of consultative ex-
pert testimony. Rule 702 regulates the testimony of expert wit-
nesses 77 and requires that the expert's testimony "assist" the
jury.78 Rule 703 stipulates that an expert may base an opinion
upon facts and information directly observed by the expert or
"made known" to the expert before the testimony.7 9 As long as
the expert uses a type of information "reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field" to establish an opinion, the actual
information that the expert used need not be admissible
evidence.8 0
These rules of evidence confer considerable discretion upon
the trial courts to admit evidence and testimony that the courts
consider relevant.8 ' Testimony is relevant if it tends to make
the existence of one or more facts in issue more probable than
they would be without the testimony.8 2 The drafters of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence recognized the potential danger in al-
76. See, e.g., Healy v. Counts, 100 F.R.D. 493, 495 (D. Colo. 1984) (conced-
ing that Rule 26 does not apply); Granger v. Wisner, 656 P.2d 1238, 1242 (Ariz.
1982) (stating that Rule 26 and the rules governing discovery do not concern
admission of expert testimony at trial); Fenlon v. Thayer, 506 A.2d 319, 321
(N.H. 1986) (stating that Rule 26 does not control); Cogdell v. Brown, 531 A.2d
1379, 1381 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (same).
Admittedly, some tension exists between the rules governing discovery and
the Federal Rules of Evidence. "Handling the opponent's expert has become
more. difficult because the rules of evidence have been liberalized over the
years, while the rules of discovery recently have been restricted." Paul F. Roth-
stein, The Collision Between New Discovery Amendments and Expert Testimony
Rules, LrrIG., Spring 1988, at 17; cf. McLaughlin, supra note 33, at 765 (noting
that federal discovery rules "give [adverse parties] nothing and damn little of
that").
77. Rule 702 states "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert... may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise." FED. R. Evm. 702.
78. Id.
79. FED. R. EviD. 703.
80. Id; see also McLaughlin, supra note 33, at 766 (describing Rule 703
parameters).
81. McLaughlin, supra note 33, at 765; see also 1 WEINSTEIN, supra note
51, T 403[01], at 403-6 (noting broad discretion that Rule 403 gives to trial
courts).
82. FED. R. EviD. 401 (defining relevant evidence as evidence having "any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the deter-
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lowing relevant but unfairly prejudicial evidence to sway the
jury.8 3 Accordingly, Rule 403 allows a trial court to exclude rele-
vant evidence whose probative value is "substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice."8 4 The rules of
evidence thus provide this safety net to exclude potentially in-
flammatory evidence.
The conflicting case law in both federal and state courts
demonstrates a need for a uniform approach to the consultative
expert dilemma. Policies underlying both Rule 26 and Rules
702, 703 and 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence can play a
decisive role in the unification process.
II. THE CURRENT SYSTEM INADEQUATELY
ADDRESSES THE CONSULTATIVE EXPERT
DILEMMA
Courts have inconsistently resolved the consultative expert
dilemma.8 5 This confusion in the law results from the inappro-
priate reliance of courts and litigators upon Rule 26 and claims
of privilege to exclude consultative expert testimony.
A. RULES OF DIscovERY Do NOT APPLY TO THE CONSULTATIVE
EXPERT DILEMMA
Rule 26 has nothing to do with admitting or compelling con-
sultative expert testimony.8 6 The adverse party seeking to pro-
duce the expert does not wish to obtain more information
through formal discovery, but wishes to put the expert on the
ruination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence").
83. FED. R. Evm. 403 advisory committee's note.
84. Rule 403 reads: "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R.
Evm. 403. Trial courts may apply Rule 403 to "all forms of evidence." 1 WEIN-
sTErN, supra note 51, 1 403[01], at 403-06.
For instances in which courts have applied the Rule 403 balancing test to
expert testimony admissible under Rule 703, see, e.g., Scott v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 789 F.2d 1052, 1055-56 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that trial court should have
applied Rule 403 to exclude "human factors" [ergonomics] expert's testimony
describing location of alleged personal injury as an "accident waiting to
happen").
85. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text (discussing conflicting
case law).
86. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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witness stand to add to the trial record.87 This distinction sepa-
rates expert discovery from expert testimony.88 For example, to
question a consultative expert about opinions in a deposition or
interrogatory, Rule 26 requires a party to demonstrate "excep-
tional circumstances."8 9 If, however, that party calls the expert
to testify on the assumption that the expert's opinion is
favorable because the opposing party declined to list the expert
as a witness, the disputed testimony ceases to be discovery and
becomes instead an evidentiary matter.90
B. No PRIVILEGE PROTECTS THE EXPERT FROM COMPELLED OR
VOLUNTARY TESTIMONY
Although litigators rely on the attorney-client privilege and
the work product rule to protect either compelled or voluntary
consultative expert testimony, these privileges do not apply.
Courts also recognize similar professional rules of conduct
within the experts' profession that would exclude their testi-
mony for an opposing party.91 Because privileges impede the
discovery of the truth,92 however, courts should narrowly con-
strue them and admit evidence absent a privilege.
9 3
The attorney-client privilege does not preclude the admis-
sion of expert testimony. The advisory committee's note to Rule
87. KAPLAN, et al., supra note 71, at 1-2, 64 (emphasizing the importance of
the trial record).
88. Some courts distinguish these procedural rules. See, e.g., Rancourt v.
Waterville Urban Renewal Auth., 223 A.2d 303, 305 (Me. 1966) ("Rule 26(b) is
neither limited by nor does it limit, the admissibility of evidence at trial. No
new privilege operative to keep otherwise admissible evidence from the Court
and jury was thereby created. The Rule was designed to regulate the discovery
and deposition process before the trial. . . ."); see also supra note 64 and accom-
panying text (stating that discovery rules do not address expert testimony).
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
90. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
91. This is true for attorneys, MODEL CODE OF PRoFEssIoNAL RESPONSIBIL-
rrY DR5-101 (1981), and, to some degree, for doctors; see, e.g., Piller v. Ko-
varsky, 476 A-2d 1279, 1282-83 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) (barring a
physician treating the plaintiff in a medical malpractice action from testifying
for the defendants); cf. Arctic Motor Freight, Inc. v. Stover, 571 P.2d 1006,
1008-09 (Alaska 1977) (discussing the extent to which plaintiff waives patient-
doctor privilege by filing personal injury claim, thus allowing defense to obtain
information about plaintiff's medical history).
92. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 28, § 2016, at 124 (noting that
"[p]rivileges are created to foster a relation that the state deems of such impor-
tance that it will encourage it even at the price of excluding helpful testimony").
93. Knoffv. American Crystal Sugar Co., 380 N.W.2d 313, 319 (N.D. 1986)
(stating that because rules of privilege inherently work against search for
truth, courts must construe them narrowly).
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26 discourages interpreting the rule to exclude expert testimony
under a broadly-construed privilege theory.94 In fact, most
courts distinguish expert witnesses from attorneys for purposes
of the attorney-client privilege.95 Moreover, the attorney-client
privilege like the work product rule does not generally apply to
information possessed by experts.96 Expert witnesses, unlike
interpreters for instance, are not necessary to confidential attor-
ney-client conversations. 97
Some courts prohibit an opposing party from compelling the
opponent's consultative expert witness to testify by using the at-
torney-client privilege. 98 This exclusion, however, applies only
to communications made by the client to the expert acting as the
attorney's agent.99 Generally, the adverse party who compels
the opponent's consultative witness to testify seeks the actual
opinion of the expert, based upon information that the attorney
provided to the expert. This set of communications does not in-
volve the client.'0 0
94. The 1970 amendments to the rules were meant to "repudiate the few
decisions that have held an expert's information privileged simply because of
his status as an expert .... " FED. R. Cirv. P. 26 advisory committee's note
(1970). Furthermore, the 1970 amendments "also reject as ill-considered the
decisions which have sought to bring expert information within the work-prod-
uct doctrine." Id.
95. E.g., Rancourt v. Waterville Urban Renewal Auth., 223 A.2d 303, 304
(Me. 1966) (concluding that relationship between expert appraiser and party is
not equivalent to attorney-client relationship); Levitsky v. Prince George's
County, 439 A.2d 600, 605 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982) (holding that appraiser is
neither client nor attorney for purposes of attorney-client privilege).
96. E.g., 2 WEiNsTEIN, supra note 51, S1 503(a)(3)[011, at 503-37 to 503-38
(stating that "the expert's observations, conclusions and information derived
from sources other than the client's communication constitute the expert's
knowledge, which, like the client's knowledge and the attorney's knowledge, is
not privileged"); 10 FED. PROC., supra note 32, § 26:121, at 357 (noting that
work product rule does not exempt discovery of expert information); Note, supra
note 28, at 520 n.33 (commenting that scholarly reviews debunked idea that
attorney-client privilege or work product rule shields expert's knowledge); Mor-
gan Chu, Discovery of Experts, LITIG., Winter 1982, at 13, 16 (arguing that ex-
pert information falls outside work product rule if counsel may show
information to expert, while refusing to show information to opposing party).
97. Friedenthal, supra note 32, at 463 (arguing that expert witnesses con-
tribute much more to trial preparation than "interpreter" would); Gross, supra
note 1, at 1151 (criticizing courts that treat experts like agents of the party and
thus include experts within the scope of the attorney-client privilege).
98. Marjorie P. Lindblom, Compelling Experts to Testify: A Proposal, 44 U.
Cm. L. REv. 851, 853 n.9 (1977) (citing cases and other authorities).
99. Id.
100. Arguably, a more difficult scenario results when a client reveals infor-
mation when both the attorney and the consultative expert are present. In that
situation, the client is not certain of confidentiality. The rationale behind the
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The attorney work product rule' 01 also does not apply to
consultative expert testimony. In essence, this rule protects
records of an attorney's thought processes.' 0 2 Even if the con-
sultative witness contributes to the attorney's preparation for
trial, the attorney's labor did not create the expert. Litigation
publications, in contrast, encourage attorneys to consider any
work given to experts (both testifying and consultative) discover-
able by the adverse party.10 3
Deep-rooted policy concerns support the admission of the
opponent's consultative expert's testimony. Trial courts assert
repeatedly that the true mission of litigation is to find "the
truth."10 4 If this assessment is correct, then trial courts should
presumptively admit expert testimony helpful to the fact
finder's determination of "the truth." This argument supersedes
claims of privilege or unfairness. 10 5
Because Rule 26 does not address the issue of consultative
expert testimony, courts must turn elsewhere to aid their deci-
attorney-client privilege promotes full disclosure to attorneys to obtain in-
formed legal advice. See supra notes 42, 45-46 and accompanying text (describ-
ing attorney-client privilege). Including expert insights within legal advice
stretches the attorney-client privilege well beyond its underlying rationale.
101. See supra notes 43, 47-49 and accompanying text (explaining work
product rule).
102. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 28, § 2021, at 178-79 (citing cases and
noting difficulty in determining when one party "may inspect documents devel-
oped in the course of his opponent's preparation of the case").
103. George Vernon, Protecting Your Expert from Discovery, FOR DEF., June
1989, at 16, 19. Vernon further advises trial lawyers not to give selected docu-
ments to a consultative witness, recommending instead that attorneys provide
the expert with information that both bolsters and criticizes their side. Id. In
this way, even if the adverse party discovers the actual reports provided to the
experts, the adverse party will be unable to determine the attorney's theory of
the case. Id.
104. E.g., Coates v. AC & S, Inc., 133 F.R.D. 109, 110 (E.D. La. 1990) ("[Tlhe
goal of litigation is not for the side with the best strategy to win; rather the goal
should be to seek the ultimate truth at issue in the matter.") (citing Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947)); Fenlon v. Thayer, 506 A.2d 319, 321 (N.H. 1986)
(same); Cogdell v. Brown, 531 A.2d 1379, 1381-82 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1987) (insisting that "a trial is essentially a search for the truth," and "[t]he
policy of the law is to allow all competent, relevant evidence to be produced,
subject only to a limited number of privileges"); cf FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory
committee's note (1983) ('The purpose of discovery is to provide a mechanism
for making relevant information available to the litigants.... Thus the spirit of
the rules is violated when advocates attempt to use discovery tools as tactical
weapons rather than to expose the facts and illuminate the issues .. ").
105. Rancourt v. Waterville Urban Renewal Auth., 223 A.2d 303, 305 (Me.
1966) ("The opinion of the expert is a fact which the fact finders may be entitled
to know. The cry of 'privilege' does not stop the Court and jury from hearing
the opinion of the expert in the search for the truth.").
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sion making.'0 6 The creation of a general evidentiary rule with
a clear standard for admitting consultative expert testimony
would allow courts to avoid confusion and steer clear of the con-
flicting policies of the current system.
III. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: REVISING THE FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE
A. CREATING RULE 707 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
Because federal and state courts have failed to solve the
nontestifying expert dilemma, Congress' 0 7 should clarify and
define the law in this area by amending the Federal Rules of
Evidence to include a uniform rule to address this problem. This
uniform, federal rule should establish a standard by which a
trial court may admit or compel the adverse party's consultative
expert testimony.'08
106. E.g., Granger v. Wisner, 656 P.2d 1238, 1241-42 (Ariz. 1982) (determin-
ing that no privilege protects consultative expert's testimony and reasoning
that court has discretion to exclude that testimony under Rule 403); Fenlon, 506
A.2d at 322 (noting that courts should rely upon evidentiary rules such as Rule
403 to address this issue of admitting consultative expert testimony rather than
the discovery rules of Rule 26); Cogdell, 531 A.2d at 1381 (relying upon more
open discovery policy underlying Rule 26 and evidentiary rules governing ad-
missibility of expert testimony).
107. The process for amending the Federal Rules of Evidence is multistaged.
The Judicial Conference includes the Chief Justice, each chief circuit judge, the
Court of International Trade chief judge, and a district judge from each circuit.
28 U.S.C. § 331 (1988 & Supp. 1994). It "[prescribes] and [publishes] the proce-
dures for the consideration" of proposed amendments to the federal rules. 28
U.S.C. § 2073(a)(1) (1988). The Judicial Conference may create committees
composed of Supreme Court justices, attorneys and judges to assist in the con-
sideration of proposed amendments. Id. § 2073(a)(2). After considering the
proposals, the Supreme Court must transmit its proposed recommendations to
Congress before May 1 of the year in which the amendments would take effect.
28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1988). Absent contrary congressional action, the proposed
amendments become effective on December 1 of that year. Id.
In addition, Congress itself may initiate amendments to the Federal Rules
of Evidence. Becker & Orenstein, supra note 17, at 859. In the past, Congress
has responded to calls for procedural reform of Rule 26. Indeed, recent changes
in Rule 26 address concerns raised by commentators and litigators alike. For
example, many commentators indicated general dissatisfaction with the rule's
preference for interrogatories in the discovery of experts. See Graham, supra
note 1, at 172-74; Wildermuth, supra note 1, at 940-42 (describing studies). The
1993 amendments to Rule 26 eliminate this interrogatory provision. FED. R.
Cxv. P. 26.
108. The Federal Rules of Evidence apply to federal courts. FED. R. Evm.
101. A majority of state courts, however, have adopted them. WmESTrmN,
supra note 51, at T-1, T-5 to T-9, and T-88 to T-91 (describing states that have
adopted Federal Rules of Evidence and any changes each state made in Rule
101 and Rules 702 and 703, concerning expert witnesses).
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Specifically, Rule 707 should admit the consultative expert
testimony if the proffering party demonstrates a reasonable
need for the testimony and agrees to pay the expert reasonable
fees for her testimony. The amended rule could read as follows:
An expert, retained by a party in anticipation of litigation as a nontes-
tifying witness, may testify for the opposing party if that party demon-
strates a reasonable need for the expert's testimony.
The advisory committee's note should further define the
contours of what constitutes "reasonable need." As an illustra-
tion, the unavailability of other experts or the opposing party's
bad faith retention of experts to shield them from discovery
could constitute reasonable need. The court may also consider
the proffering party's inability to locate a comparable expert, as
when one party lacks the financial resources to retain an expert
outside of the jurisdiction. In deciding whether to compel an ex-
pert's testimony, the trial court should give serious considera-
tion to the proffering party's amenability to pay the expert'0 9
and the expert's willingness to testify. 110 The reasonable need
standard would prevent bad faith litigation tactics, but would
allow more access to consultative expert testimony than Rule 26
makes available.
The reasonable need standard differs from Rule 26's "excep-
tional circumstances"""' standard in both its goals and practice.
Rule 707 would regulate consultative expert testimony, while
Rule 26's exceptional circumstances standard affects only dis-
covery, because Rule 26 does not authorize a party to either re-
quest or compel the opponent's consultative expert to testify.
Additionally, the two standards assess different factors. The ex-
ceptional circumstances standard considers: the near impossi-
bility of otherwise obtaining the information sought in
discovery, a "substantial need" for the information, and the de-
monstrable fairness of the discovery. 112 Under Rule 707, courts
109. Carrasquillo v. Rothschild, 443 N.Y.S.2d 113, 115 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981)
(reasoning that proffering party should pay for expert's time in testifying).
110. See, e.g., id. (stating that expert must be willing to work with other side
before court will compel testimony); see also infra note 135 and accompanying
text (stating that fairness requires that expert be available to proffering party).
But see Fenlon, 506 A.2d at 322 ("The expert's desire not to testify . . .[is]
immaterial.").
111. Under Rule 26, the party seeking discovery of a consultative expert
must demonstrate "exceptional circumstances." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
112. Virginia G. Maurer, Compelling the Expert Witness: Fairness and Util-
ity under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 19 GA. L. REV. 71, 91 n.74 (1984)
(citing Thomas R. Trenkner, Pretrial Discovery of Facts Known and Opinions
Held by Opponent's Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, Annotation, 33 A.L.R. FED. 403, 465-74 (1977)).
1210
1994] CONSULTATIVE EXPERT TESTIMONY
would consider: the inability to locate a comparable expert with-
out undue burden, the number and quality of other experts read-
fly available to the party, bad faith expert shielding, the amount
of time and money the retaining party has invested in the con-
tested expert, the extent to which the expert assisted in creating
a theory of the case, and additional considerations of fairness.
Courts may also consider the disparity of resources between the
parties, especially if one party uses its greater resources to "buy"
local experts and force the other party to search for experts out
of state, incurring a greater cost.
The reasonable need standard creates a threshold that the
proffering party must cross to examine the opponent's expert.
The trial court must first determine whether the proffering
party has met the reasonable need standard before applying
Rule 403, which excludes evidence that may prejudice the trier
of fact. Unlike Rule 403, which addresses already relevant and
otherwise admissible testimony, the proposed amendment re-
quires the proffering party to meet the reasonable need test
before the court may admit the expert's testimony. Of course,
once the court admits the expert's testimony, Rule 403 applies to
the testimony itself.113 Rule 403 thus prevents the possibility of
unfair prejudice springing from the expert's testimony. This
built-in flexibility enables the trial court to answer the specific
needs of each case while following a uniform, general rule.
B. ATTRIBUTES OF THE REASONABLE NEED TEST AND ITS
IMPACT UPON THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY
The proposal set forth in this Note offers flexibility and sta-
bility and relies upon existing evidentiary protections. Although
the conflicting case law of consultative expert testimony demon-
strates the need for uniform regulation, this rule does not advo-
cate either automatic admission or exclusion of the disputed
expert testimony. Automatic admission may allow abusive ma-
nipulation of the discovery and use of evidence at trial. By the
same token, automatic exclusion of the expert testimony may
encourage shielding consultative experts. Creating a reasonable
need standard in Rule 707 provides the stability of a general
113. See, e.g., Fenlon, 506 A.2d at 322 (noting that consultative expert's tes-
timony is still subject to Rule 403's ban against prejudicial, misleading, and
cumulative evidence). Thus, a court may still apply Rule 403 to exclude testi-
mony regarding the expert's prior employment vith the opposing party. See
infra notes 115-117 and accompanying text.
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rule, which will allow the trial court to encourage a more con-
stant exchange of information and discourage expert
shielding.114
Even if the trial court determines that questioning an ex-
pert about original retention by the adverse party is unfair, the
trial court may still allow the expert to testify. The court has
several ways to insure that inflammatory or highly prejudicial
evidence does not taint the trial record. The trial court may use
either Rule 403 or a motion in limine"15 to limit the direct exam-
ination to the expert's opinion, omitting reference to the expert's
prior retention by the adverse party.116 The trial court can read-
ily enforce this restriction:117 the expert may mention earlier
reports or material the expert used in formulating a conclusion
114. See, e.g., Bockweg v. Anderson, 117 F.R.D. 563, 566 (M.D.N.C. 1987)
(allowing additional discovery of the opponent's expert and stating that
although "discretion creates uncertainty, it also permits a more reasoned deci-
sion, taking into account the peculiarities and needs of each case and the bene-
fit of the Court's growing experience").
115. ROGER C. PARK, TRaAL OBJEcTIoNs HANDBOOK 4-5 (1991) (discussing
motion in limine). The court may also grant a limiting instruction. Id. at 18.
116. This scenario assumes that the expert's testimony about her recent
work with the retaining party meets the reasonable need test, but fails the Rule
403 balancing test. See id. at 18. Park explains that "[elven if evidence is ruled
admissible, the purposes for which the evidence can be used may be limited.
Or, only part of it may be admissible." Id. In that case, the objecting trial attor-
ney should request a limiting instruction. Id.
117. A sample direct examination of the adverse party's consultative expert
(after qualifying the witness as an expert) in a medical malpractice action
might proceed as follows:
Q. Did you examine Mr. Smith?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you have an opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty
as to the cause of Mr. Smith's injury?
A. I do.
Q. What is your opinion?
A. I think the XYZ drug administered by Dr. Jones did not cause Mr.
Smith's injury.
Q. Did you examine Mr. Smith's medical reports?
A. Yes.
Q. Who gave you those medical reports? -Objection.
Sustained.
As soon as the attorney conducting the direct examination asks the expert
about the source of the documents she examined, the adverse party may object.
The trial court may thus exclude the fact that the expert previously worked for
the adverse party.
By extension, if reports or other documents come into evidence through the
expert and those papers contain the original employing party's name, the trial
court may strike its name from the documents to remove any trace of the origi-
nal source of the information upon which the expert relied.
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but may not directly reveal having obtained this information
from the adverse party.118
Rule 707 will not alter the federal rules concerning a trial
court's ability to subpoena an expert witness. 1 9 The court's
power to compel expert testimony, however, is limited to the
scope of its subpoena power. 120 This factor narrows the extent
to which consultative expert testimony will be compelled against
the expert's will.
As a federal evidentiary rule, Rule 707 will apply to both
civil and criminal trials. 121 In criminal trials, however, different
factors will arise. 122 For example, prosecutors already must re-
veal beneficial evidence to the defendant.123 Criminal courts
118. See, e.g., Steele v. Seglie, No. 84-2200, 1986 WL 30765, at *4 (D. Kan.
Mar. 27, 1986) (noting that the court may avoid concerns about crafty cross-
examination through "careful limitations on the type of questions allowed to be
posed to these experts").
119. Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Otte, 474 F.2d 529, 536 (2d Cir. 1972) ("The
weight of authority holds that, although it is not the usual practice, a court does
have the power to subpoena an expert witness and, though it cannot require
him to conduct any examinations... it can require him to state whatever opin-
ions he may have previously formed.") (citations omitted), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
929 (1973).
120. Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure limits the court's power
to subpoena a "person who is not a party or an officer of a party" to 100 miles
from "the place where that person resides, is employed or regularly transacts
business in person." FED. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(ii). In criminal trials, however,
a subpoena "requiring the attendance of a witness" at trial "may be served at
any place within the United States." FED. R. Cmiu. P. 17(e)(1). Additional crim-
inal discovery rules limit this far-reaching subpoena power in criminal trials.
See infra notes 123-124 and accompanying text.
121. The Federal Rules of Evidence "govern proceedings in the courts of the
United States...." FED. R. EvID. 101.
122. The federal criminal rules governing discovery differ from Rule 26.
Under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which regulates dis-
covery, if the defendant requests a summary of the prosecution's expert testi-
mony, the government must provide this summary and the defendant, in
return, must disclose a summary of its expert testimony. FED. R. Crum. P.
16(a)(1)(E) and 16(b)(1)(C). "[Sitatements" made by either of the two parties'
"prospective witnesses" are not "subject to disclosure." FED. R. Cami. P. 16(a)(2)
and 16(b)(2). Like Rule 26, however, Rule 16 does not refer to calling or compel-
ling the opponent's consultative expert to testify because the summary "only
applies to expert witnesses that each side intends to call." FED. R. CRIm. P. 16
advisory committee's notes.
Expert testimony in criminal cases arises in another context. If a defend-
ant intends to call an expert to testify about the defendant's mental condition,
he must notify the government in advance. FED. R. Cram. P. 12.2(b).
123. The prosecution has a constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory evi-
dence to the defendant if the evidence is "'material'... [defined as] 'a reason-
able probability' that, had disclosure been made, the 'result of the proceeding
would have been different.'" WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMNAL
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should emphasize the importance of fundamental fairness when
considering a request to allow or compel the defendant's consult-
ative expert to testify against the defense. 124
The proposed amendment is consistent with the rules gov-
erning civil discovery. Rule 707 does not alter Rule 26's prohibi-
tion of deposing a consultative expert until the requesting party
demonstrates "exceptional circumstances."125 Indeed, formal
discovery is not always necessary. If a consultative expert vol-
untarily agrees to testify for the opposing party, as in the
Healy126 case, the expert will tell that party what it needs to
know to prepare for direct examination.127 Admittedly, this in-
formal discovery process cannot occur when the consultative ex-
pert does not want to testify for the opponent. In that case, the
proffering party must either meet the exceptional circumstances
requirement of Rule 26128 or find an external source of the ex-
pert's opinion, such as published articles or, as in the Fenlon
case, 129 a report written by the expert.13 0 If not, the proffering
party may have to content itself with the opportunity to directly
PROCEDURE § 20.7, at 890 (2d ed. 1992) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473
U.S. 667 (1985)).
124. Courts may be reluctant to allow the prosecution to call the defendant's
expert, while allowing the defendant to call or compel the prosecution's expert
to testify. A court probably will not admit the defendant's former expert's testi-
mony, barring unusual circumstances. For example, in Morris v. State, the
court allowed the prosecution to summon an expert, whom the defense initially
consulted, to testify because the scientific tests that the expert performed on
the accused's clothing destroyed the clothing. 477 A.2d 1206, 1211-12 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1984). The Morris court determined that admitting the testimony
best served societal interests. Id.
If the prosecution, on the other hand, obtains an unfavorable expert opin-
ion about the defendant's mental condition or other beneficial information, the
government must disclose this information to the defendant. See LAFAvE &
ISRAEL, supra note 123, at 883-95 (describing historical emergence of govern-
ment's duty to disclose).
125. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
126. 100 F.R.D. at 494; see supra text accompanying notes 5-7 (describing
facts of case).
127. The consultative expert must be careful not to break an agreement
with the original retaining party in disclosing this information to the opposing
party.
128. Indeed, the circumstances giving rise to a reasonable need for the con-
sultative expert's testimony may meet the exceptional circumstances standard.
For example, the retaining party may have employed bad faith tactics such as
expert shielding.
129. 506 A.2d at 320; see supra text accompanying notes 8-10.
130. In addition, if the retaining party first designated the expert as a testi-
fying witness, it gave the proffering party a report describing, inter alia, the
substance of the expert's testimony and qualifications. FED. R. Cirv. P.
26(a)(2)(B). The proffering party thus generally knows about the expert's opin-
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examine the expert at trial, and forego formal discovery of the
expert's opinion. A party might be willing to risk allowing the
expert to testify without formal discovery if the expert is the
only one within the party's jurisdiction who speaks
articulately. 13 1
The proposed amendment may affect expert discovery in
several different ways. It may encourage attorneys to select
only experts who will are sure to agree with their view of the
case. Perhaps attorneys will rely more upon testifying experts.
Rule 707 should impair the effectiveness of expert shielding' 32
because consultative experts would no longer be locked away
from the opposing party.
C. RESPONDING TO POTENTIAL CRITICISMS OF THE PROPOSED
AMENDMENT
Critics attack the admission of consultative expert testi-
mony on several grounds. They claim the testimony is unfair
and leads to abusive discovery practices as well as ethical
problems. 133 Each of the critics' arguments for excluding the
contested expert testimony, however, generates an argument
supporting its admission.
The proposed amendment prevents unfairness. The unfair-
ness rule prohibits the discovering party from obtaining benefi-
cial testimony at its opponent's expense.' 34 The unfairness rule
may actually justify admitting the consultative expert's testi-
ion. Admittedly, this general knowledge is not as helpful as a formal deposi-
tion, but, it is better than no information at all.
131. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (describing superficial charac-
teristics sought in testifying expert). In some fields, for example, an expert's
ability to either describe technical terms in easy to understand vernacular or
his ability to speak English fluently may well be important to the party proffer-
ing his testimony. Supra note 2.
132. See McDonald, supra note 32.
133. Courts have stated several reasons to exclude the consultative expert's
testimony. See, e.g., Campbell Indus. v. MV Gemini, 619 F.2d 24, 26-27 (9th
Cir. 1980) (using Rule 26 itself); Healy v. Counts, 100 F.R.D. 493, 496-97 (D.
Colo. 1984) (expressing fear of negative impact that allowing adverse party's
consultative experts to testify would have upon availability of consultative ex-
perts); Piller v. Kovarsky, 476 A.2d 1279, 1282 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984)
(excluding consultative expert's testimony because it was protected by
privilege).
134. The unfairness rule, however, does not necessarily exclude the consult-
ative expert's testimony because it is not a privilege. See Friedenthal, supra
note 32, at 479 (describing rule as policy preference). Courts must thus ap-
proach the unfairness rule within its policy context and not as a principle of
absolute exclusion.
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mony. Courts have already allowed consultative experts to tes-
tify out of fairness to the proffering party.135 Excluding the
expert's testimony allows a party to "buy" an expert's opinion. 136
Paying an expert, however, does not give a party exclusive
rights to the expert's opinion.137 Otherwise one party may "buy"
experts to hide them from the adverse party.1 38 This argument
may be described as an "inverse unfairness rule." 3 9
The proposed amendment guards against discovery abuse.
Although some concern exists that allowing adverse parties to
compel each other's consultative experts to testify would open
the door to unnecessary discovery and collateral issues,140 the
advantages outweigh the disadvantages. 14 1 By the same token,
135. See, e.g., United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66, 76 (9th Cir. 1968) (stat-
ing that "we do not believe that ... [the unfairness rule] is a sufficient justifica-
tion for the application in condemnation cases of a rule which would deny a
litigant the testimony of a witness rejected by his opponent simply because his
opponent reached the witness first and paid for his services"); Fenlon v. Thayer,
506 A.2d 319, 321-23 (N.H. 1986) (reasoning that trial is search for truth and
that because consultative expert's testimony assists jury in that search, court
should admit testimony in fairness to proffering party); Carrasquillo v. Roths-
child, 443 N.Y.S.2d 113, 115 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (concluding that expert's opin-
ion "should be equally available to all parties willing to pay an appropriate fee
for time consumed by travel and testimony"); see also Hayes & Ryder, supra
note 52, at 1131-32 (citing cases).
136. See supra note 68 and accompanying text; see also Carrasquillo, 443
N.Y.S.2d at 115 ("The testimony of a witness, particularly an expert, should be
totally unaffected by the question of which party to the litigation retains that
expert. An expert belongs to no one.") (citing Milton R. Wessel, Institutional
Responsibility, Professionalism and Ethics, 60 NEB. L. REV. 504 (1981)); cf.
Gross, supra note 1, at 1129 (relating the old joke that expert witnesses are "'a
safe legal way to buy a verdict'").
137. Rancourt v. Waterville Urban Renewal Auth., 223 A.2d 303, 305 (Me.
1966) ("The fact that the opinion was obtained at the expense of the defendant
and for its information and use only, does not force the conclusion that the ex-
pert may not testify from the stand at the request of the opposing party without
the consent of his employer."); State Highway Comm'n v. Earl, 143 N.W.2d 88,
93 (S.D. 1966) (holding that expert's previous retention by defendant "did not
create a contractual or proprietary right in either defendant or the expert to
suppress or withhold from evidence this expert's formed opinion").
138. One commentator has argued that "[tihe first party to reach and 'buy'
an expert, because of the stringent showing required for discovery of non-testi-
fying experts, would be able to suppress unfavorable findings of that expert
simply by declining to offer his testimony at trial." Crockett, supra note 44, at
406.
139. See Wildermuth, supra note 1, at 952 (arguing that expert shielding
"may, ironically, subvert the unfairness principles [Rule 26] was designed to
remedy").
140. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text (describing adverse im-
pact of compelling consultative expert to testify).
141. Some courts acknowledge the potential of discovery abuse even as they
conclude that they favor liberal discovery of experts. The Bockweg court dis-
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however, compelling expert testimony might check the ravages
of "expert shopping" 142 and "expert shielding"'14 3-abuses cur-
rently employed by many litigators. If trial lawyers anticipate
facing their own expert across the witness stand, they will nar-
row their selection of experts instead of attempting to corner
and buy out the market.'"
Rule 707 will not alter the way litigators prepare for their
expert witnesses' testimony. Currently, many litigation publica-
tions encourage attorneys to obtain several kinds of Rule 26 ex-
perts, in order to provide both backup trial witnesses and to hide
unfavorable experts.145 According to these publications, attor-
neys should assume that current rules protect almost none of
their expert's research from discovery 46 and should draft all of
their correspondence with experts under the assumption that it
will be discovered by the adverse party.147
cussed this dilemma, and then sided with more open discovery: "[a]s matters
presently stand, the apparent advantages derived from permitting liberal dis-
covery of expert witnesses outweigh the potential abuses." Bockweg v. Ander-
son 117 F.R.D. 563, 566 (M.D. N.C. 1987).
142. See, e.g., Peter I. Ostroff, Experts: A Few Fundamentals, LITIG., Winter
1982, at 8, 9 (recommending qualities that attorneys should consider in their
search for expert with the "right" opinion).
143. See McDonald, supra note 32, at 1030 (discussing extensive dangers of
expert shielding).
144. The opposing argument insists that litigators will carefully select only
experts who will agree with the parties who hire them. In this sense, by trying
to expose more of the litigator's information to the "truth" searching process,
savvy litigators will obscure the truth by paying experts whose loyalty to their
employers comes before their concern for the truth. But see Carrasquillo v.
Rothschild, 443 N.Y.S.2d 113, 115 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (stating that courts com-
mit "gross disservice" to experts by assuming that experts will base opinion
upon which party pays).
145. See, e.g., Suplee & Woodruff, supra note 14, at 11 (suggesting that at-
torneys should retain two or more types of Rule 26 witnesses so that if expert's
research or tests go awry attorney may classify expert as consultant and pre-
vent opponent from discovering expert); Ostroff, supra note 142, at 8-9 (recom-
mending"spare" experts because many will reach the "wrong" conclusion or will
be otherwise incompatible with party's needs).
146. See, e.g., Ostroff, supra note 142, at 9 (advising attorneys to consider all
information given to and received from experts as discoverable and further sug-
gesting that consultative expert not talk with trial expert for fear of discovery
through trial expert); Suplee & Woodruff, supra note 14, at 17 (attorneys should
assume that nothing, including data and conversations with consultative ex-
perts, is protected from discovery); Vernon, supra note 103, at 18 (recom-
mending that attorneys assume that any written work given to expert is
discoverable).
147. Suplee & Woodruff, supra note 14, at 17-18. In light of these assump-
tions, one prominent commentator advises an "exclusivity provision preventing
the expert from consulting with any other party to the litigation." Graham,
supra note 1, at 195. At this time, courts have not yet compelled an expert to
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The proposed amendment will not exclude experts from the
courtroom. Rather, it will give them greater freedom to testify.
Experts must be true to themselves and their profession. When
litigators retain experts for use as non-testifying witnesses,
they-at least in principle-hire the expert to provide an impar-
tial, honest opinion. 148 Under the current rules of discovery,
however, the retaining party may monopolize a consultative ex-
pert, regardless of the expert's view of the case. The expert, by
agreeing to examine preliminary materials of a case, should not
feel forever bound to that side of the litigation even if the expert
disagrees with it.149 The proposed amendment thus permits a
consultative expert the opportunity to serve the party that the
expert opinion supports if that party demonstrates a reasonable
need for the testimony. In this way, the expert obtains freer ac-
cess to the courtroom, not banishment from it.
CONCLUSION
In light of the conflicting case law and procedural rules,
Congress should promulgate an evidentiary provision concern-
ing the consultative expert witness dilemma. The rule should
allow experts retained as nontestifying witnesses to testify at
trial for the adverse party if the proffering party demonstrates a
reasonable need for the testimony. This regulation best suits
the more open discovery and evidentiary policies currently in
place. If such testimony proves to be too prejudicial, the trial
court may always exclude or properly limit the scope of the ex-
pert's testimony. By promulgating this rule, experts may yet
again prove a valuable source of information for the trier of fact.
testify despite an exclusivity clause in the expert's contract with the original
party. Id.
148. Some courts emphasize the fact that the expert is not bound by the
source of her payment. Carrasquillo, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 115 (reasoning that "[to
conclude that the opinion will in any way, be based on which party pays for the
examination... and on which party pays for the testimony, does gross disser-
vice to the expert and to his or her integrity").
149. Commentators split on this issue. Some contend that experts naturally
would support the party that hired them or, would not attempt to talk to the
adverse party. Platt, supra note 39, at 363. Other commentators note that ex-
perts who are not retained to testify, but to "brief" the attorney may be quite
surprised to find they cannot offer their testimony to the side with whom they
agree. See Gross, supra note 1, at 1150.
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